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Abstract
The  Grid  accounting  and  auditing  mechanisms  
were designed under the assumption that users would  
submit  their  jobs  directly  to  the  Grid  gatekeepers.  
However, many groups are starting to use pilot-based  
systems,  where  users  submit  jobs  to  a  centralized  
queue  and  are  successively  transferred  to  the  Grid  
resources  by  the  pilot  infrastructure.  While  this  
approach  greatly  improves  the  user  experience,  it  
does disrupt the established accounting and auditing  
procedures.  Open  Science  Grid  deploys  gLExec  on  
the worker nodes to keep the pilot-related accounting  
and  auditing  information  and  centralizes  the  
accounting collection with GRATIA.
1. Introduction
Job  accounting  and  auditing  information  is 
important both for the economics of the Grid and for 
detecting  anomalous  behavior.  However,  while  the 
original  Grid  authentication,  authorization, 
accounting  and auditing  mechanisms  were  designed 
under  the assumption  that  users  would  submit  their 
jobs  directly  to  the  Grid  gatekeepers,  direct 
submission accounted for only a tiny fraction of job 
submissions.  With  the  proliferation  of  Grid  sites, 
most  users  prefer  to  submit  their  jobs  to  an 
intermediate queue and have a workload management 
system (WMS) distribute  their  jobs  among the Grid 
sites. 
Over the past few years, many groups have started 
to  use  pilot-based  WMSes  for  their  ability  to  keep 
Grid-wide  fair  share  between  their  users.  These 
systems  do not  submit  the jobs  directly  to  the Grid 
gatekeepers, but send only so-called pilot jobs. Once 
a pilot  job  starts  on a Grid  resource,  it  will  fetch a 
real  user  job  and  execute  it.  The  traditional  Grid 
authentication, authorization, accounting and auditing 
mechanisms are not used by the pilot, subverting the 
established  accounting  and  auditing  procedures. 
Examples  of  pilot-based  WMSes  are  DIRAC[1], 
glideinWMS[2] and PanDa[3]. 
Open  Science  Grid  (OSG)[4]  addresses  these 
problems with gLExec and GRATIA.
2.  Accounting  and  auditing  problems  of 
the traditional Grid model
In  the  traditional  Grid  model,  the  site  Grid 
gatekeeper  is  responsible  for  authenticating  and 
authorizing  a  user  based  on  the  provided  X.509 
proxy certificate. If a user is accepted,  his/her job is 
submitted  to  a local  batch  system  that  handles  the 
job  from  that  moment  on.  The  accounting  and 
auditing  systems  monitor  the  gatekeeper  and  the 
batch  system  activity,  extracting  the  needed 
accounting and auditing information. See Figure 1 for 
an overview.
Figure 1. Traditional Grid workflow
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Pilot-based  WMSes  have  quite  a  different 
workflow.  Here,  users  submit  jobs  to  a  WMS 
specific  batch  system  and  their  presence  triggers  a 
pilot  factory  to send pilot  jobs to various Grid sites. 
The pilot  jobs  then follow the path user  jobs  would 
and eventually  start  on a set  of worker  nodes.  Each 
pilot  job then pulls a user job from the WMS batch 
system and executes it. See Figure 2 for an overview. 
However, the accounting and auditing systems are 
still  only  monitoring  the  site  provided  gatekeeper 
and batch system.  They  cannot  distinguish  between 
resources  used by the final user jobs from resources 
used  by  the  pilot  infrastructure.  Thus  all  the 
processes  will  result  as being  ran by  the  pilot  user 
and the resources will be accounted to the pilot itself. 
This  is  often  unacceptable  from  both  the  pilot 
owner's and the site administrator's points of view. 
Having  accurate  per-user  accounting  information 
can  be  important  when  justifying  the  requisition 
orders.  Many sites  receive  financing both  from  VO 
sponsors and from local community sponsors. A site 
may  need  to  demonstrate  that  local  users  actually 
used  the  resources  sponsored  by  the  local 
community.
Having  detailed  auditing  information  is  also 
essential.  If  a  process  is  found  to  be  performing 
unauthorized  or  illegal  activity,  the  responsible 
person  must  be  accurately  identified.  Sites  usually 
need to be able to determine this information without 
involving the pilot owner. At the same time, the pilot 
owners  do  not  want  to  be  held  responsible  for  the 
actions of users they are serving.
3. Installing a gatekeeper on every worker 
node
In  order  to  get  proper  accounting  and  auditing 
information,  pilot  jobs  need  to  inform  the  local 
security  system  when running a user  job.  However, 
pilot jobs cannot be blindly trusted by the Grid sites, 
so  the  sites  need  a  trusted,  local  tool  with  the 
following requirements:
• Resources will be accounted to a user if and only 
if a pilot job is able to demonstrate that that user 
entrusted  it  with  his/her  job.  Possession  of   a 
valid  users's  X.509  proxy  certificate  is  the 
minimum requirement.
• The tool  must  be able to automatically compute 
the  user  job's  accounting  information  and 
distinguish between user and pilot  processes for 
auditing purposes.  In other words,  the tool must 
not  rely  on  the  pilot  job  to  provide  this 
information. 
OSG has  started  deploying  gLExec[5],  a X.509-
aware  derivative  of  the  Apache  suexec[6],  on  its 
worker  nodes.  gLExec  is  a  privileged  executable 
that,  given  a X.509  proxy  certificate,  authenticates 
and authorizes  the user  and runs the associated  user 
job under the appropriate local identity, allowing for 
reliable auditing and accounting. In other words, it is 
like having a gatekeeper on every worker node.
Once  gLExec  is  deployed  on  the  worker  nodes, 
pilot  jobs  can use it  to  launch the users'  jobs.  With 
the  accounting  and  auditing  systems  now  also 
monitoring the  “gatekeepers” on the  worker  nodes, 
the accounting and auditing information is once again 
correct. See Figure 3 for an overview.
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4.  Accounting  and  auditing  information 
provided by gLExec monitoring in OSG
On  OSG  resources,  gLExec  is  configured  to 
interface to the GUMS[7] authorization and mapping 
system,  and  is  using  a  OSG-specific  monitoring 
process  that  is  launched  at  user  job  startup.  The 
monitoring  process  logs  both  the  information 
involved  in  the  authorization  and  the  information 
about the user job's  processes.  All of these data can 
be used for auditing and accounting purposes.
4.1. User authorization information
gLExec logs all the invocation attempts.  If a valid 
X.509  proxy  certificate  is  presented,  the  following 
information,  the same that  is sent  to  GUMS, is also 
logged:
• The  X.509  Subject,  also  known  as  the 
Distinguished Name (DN).
• The Fully Qualified Attribute  Name (FQAN) of 
an eventual VOMS extended attribute.
• The VO name and Issuer DN of the FQAN in the 
VOMS extended attribute.
If  GUMS  authorizes  the  user,  the  following 
information is also logged: 
• The  UNIX  User  Identifier  (UID)  the  user  job 
processes will run as.
4.2. Collecting job information
Once  a  user  job  starts,  the  monitoring  process 
starts tracking the job process tree and measuring its 
CPU usage. 
In  general,  tracking  process  families  can  be 
difficult to do reliably.  The OSG gLExec monitoring 
relies  on  the  Condor[8]  procd  daemon,  that  uses  a 
novel  approach  of  dedicated  tracking  secondary 
Group  Identifiers  (GIDs)  to  achieve  the  goal.  A 
detailed description of the process is presented in the 
next section.
The  monitoring  process  logs  accounting  and 
auditing  information  of  long  running  processes, 
defined as lasting more than 5 minutes. Shorter lived 
processes  are  not  considered  important  enough  to 
warrant the additional log space. Moreover,  auditing 
and accounting information of the job as a whole are 
logged, too.
The auditing and accounting data logged for  each 
process/job are:
• Start time and end time, effectively obtaining the 
wallclock time used by the process/job.
• CPU used by the process/job, split between CPU 
used in user state and CPU used in system state.
• The parent process id of the monitored process.
The  information  is  collected  by  polling  the 
process  tree at regular intervals,  currently  fixed at 1 
minute.  Since  only  long  running  processes  are 
logged,  no  interesting  auditing  information  is  lost. 
However,  the process accounting information can be 
underestimated by up to one minute. 
It  is  also  worth  noting  that  while  the  total 
wallclock time is always accurately reported,  the job 
total CPU usage can be significantly underreported if 
the  user  job  spawns  a large  amount  of  very  short, 
CPU intensive processes, and does not wait for them 
to finish. Although this is a real problem, it was not 
deemed  worth  the  additional  monitoring  load 
necessary to properly handle it.
5. Reliable process family tracking
Tracking  process  families  can be  difficult  to  do 
reliably. The basic approach is to use process parent-
child relationships as shown in Figure 4.
However,  while the above method works well for 
a large class of well behaved jobs, a determined user 
can  easily  circumvent  it.  The  parent-child 
relationship  can easily be broken by terminating the 
parent  while  leaving  the  child  alive,  as  shown  in 
Figure  5.  Such  processes  are  typically  called 
daemonized processes.
This  technique  can  be  very  effective  in  evading 
process relationship tracking. If the parent lives for a 
very short  time, even periodic polling and recording 
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Figure 4. Parent-child relationship
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of  the  complete  process  tree  will  miss  a  large 
fraction of daemonized processes.
It should be noted that while there is no real need 
for  any  non-malicious  job  to  produce  daemonized 
processes,  using  them  can  sometimes  ease  the 
maintenance of grid job scripts.  A classical example 
is represented  by a network transfer  companion to a 
CPU intensive  application.  Using a nested  script  to 
start  the  companion  binary  will  almost  certainly 
break the parent-child relationship.  While this could 
be avoided  by directly  invoking the companion,  the 
flexibility of using scripts certainly represents a valid 
use case that should be supported.
5.1. The ideal process tracker
In order  to  reliably track the process  family tree, 
an additional unique token can be used. If the parent-
child  relationship  is broken as described  above, any 
process  containing the token is known to be part  of 
the user's job. See Figure 6 for an overview.
In  the  context  of  token-based  tracking,  an ideal 
tracking system would satisfy all of the requirements 
listed below:
1) The token  must  be  inherited  across  forks  and 
execs.
2) The token  doesn't  effect  the  semantics  of  the 
children.
3) Only a process with root  privilege can insert  a 
token.
4) The  token  cannot  be  removed  by  the  child 
processes.
5) Root privilege is not needed to read the tokens 
from any process on the systems.
6) Multiple  tokens  are allowed  in the system,  so 
that  multiple  independent  groups  can  be 
tracked.
7) Multiple  tokens  are  allowed  in  any  process, 
allowing for nested groups to be tracked.
We are not aware of any system that meets  all of 
these requirements.  In the next sections we describe 
a few widely used methods, followed by the method 
used by the gLExec monitor.
5.2. Using process groups for process tracking
A popular approach for  process  tracking is based 
on process  groups.  The job's  initial  process  starts  a 
new session, becoming the session leader, and all the 
children  inherit  the  same process  group.  The UNIX 
shell  and  the  PBS  batch  system[9]  are  known  to 
heavily rely on this method.
This method violates the rules #3, #4 and #7. Rule 
#4 is the most  troublesome, i.e. the process group is 
not protected information and can be changed by the 
child processes  at any time.  So it  cannot  be used to 
obtain  reliable  monitoring  and  accounting 
information.
5.3. Using environment  variables  for  process 
tracking
The  environment  associated  with  a  process  can 
also be used for tracking. Any variable stored in the 
initial process  environment  is inherited  by the child 
processes.  By using well  structured  unique  variable 
names it is easy to track the process tree. The Condor 
batch system has been relying on it for years.
This method  violates  the rules  #3 and #4. Again, 
the violation of rule  #4 prevents  it  from being used 
for  reliable  monitoring  and accounting.  Indeed,  any 
child  process  can  add,  change  or  remove  any 
environment variable.
5.4. Using  user identifiers for process tracking
A reliable token that all UNIX processes posses is 
the  User  Identifier  (UID).  Only  a  tools  with  root 
privilege  can  change  the  UID  of  a  process.  The 
Condor batch system is known to support this option 
for dedicated batch system resources.
This  method  violates  the  rules  #2  and  #7.  The 
violation of  rule  #2 makes  it  usable in very  limited 
setups  only.  However,  when  using  dedicated  UIDs 
for  process  tracking  is  an  acceptable  option,  this 
method is very reliable.
5.5.  Using  secondary  group  identifiers  for 
process tracking
Secondary  Group  Identifiers  (GIDs)  are  also  a 
reliable  feature  of  all  the  UNIX processes.   Only  a 
tool  with  root  privilege  can  add  or  remove  a 
Figure 6. Process tracking using a 
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secondary  GID  to/from  the  list.  The  OSG  gLExec 
monitor and recent Condor versions use this method.
This method  violates  the  rule  #2.  However,  it  is 
relatively easy for a system administrator to set aside 
a dedicated set of GIDs, making this reliable method 
deployable in most batch setups.
Figure  7 shows  an overview  of  secondary  GIDs 
for process tracking.
6.  Integration  with  the  OSG  accounting 
system
GRATIA[10]  is  the  official  OSG  accounting 
system.  GRATIA  has a modular  architecture  based 
on  probes  that  allows  for  a  flexible  collection  of 
information. GRATIA probes exist  for all the major 
batch  systems  deployed  in  OSG  as  well  as  for 
gLExec.
Grid sites can be configured to report to a local or 
to the OSG-central collector.  When a local collector 
is used, (a subset of) collected data is also forwarded 
to  the  OSG-central  collector.  Detailed  message 
passing description is however  beyond  the scope of 
this paper. See Figure 8 for an overview.
To obtain correct accounting information for pilot 
jobs,  one needs  to  subtract  the  resources  accounted 
to  the  final  users  by  the  gLExec  probe,  from  the 
resources  accounted  to  the  pilot  job  by  the  batch 
system probe. 
In  OSG this  can be  done  only  in  an aggregated 
mode  (as opposed  to  job  by job  accounting) today, 
as  there  is  no  direct  correlation  between  the 
information  provided  by  the  batch  system  probe, 
running  on  the  Grid  gatekeeper,  and  the  gLExec 
probe,  running  on  one  of  the  worker  nodes.  We 
expect  that future versions of GRATIA will address 
this problem.
7. Conclusions
Job  accounting  and  auditing  information  is 
important both for the economics of the Grid and for 
detecting anomalous behavior.  However,  pilot-based 
WMSes  circumvent  the  established  accounting  and 
auditing  mechanisms.  To  properly  detect  the  jobs 
handled  by  pilot-based  WMSes,  OSG is  relying  on 
gLExec, deployed on each and every worker node, to 
properly track the user processes and account for the 
user  CPU consumption.  The accounting  records  are 
aggregated  in  a  centralized  store  by  the  GRATIA 
system.
A  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  described 
system  is  the  use  of  group  identifiers  for  job 
tracking,  allowing  for  reliable  auditing  and 
accounting  even  in  the  event  of  daemonized 
processes.
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